In early 2003, France actively tried to thwart the plans
I. Introduction
Pressures to change consumer tastes and purchasing behavior abound. Some come from market participants, such as producers and merchants who engage in advertising and marketing campaigns. But nonmarket participants are also prominent, in particular the politicians and activists who encourage consumer boycotts for particular causes. Boycotts are alleged to have helped migrant farm workers in California gain increased pay and to have helped end the * The authors thank the Public Policy Institute of California for partial funding of this research. The research for this article was conducted when Shatz was a research fellow at the Public Policy Institute of California. Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the RAND Corporation or its research clients or sponsors, the views of the staff, officers, or board of directors of the Public Policy Institute of California, or the views of the other institutions listed below. We are deeply indebted to Frank Vannerson of Mt. Lucas Management Corporation for data, and for many helpful discussions and useful comments. a Economics Department, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544-2098, Tel (609) Fax (609) 258-2907, email: c6789@Princeton.EDU b Economics Department, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14850, Tel (607) 232-2147, Fax (607) 255-2818, email: smc227@cornell.edu c RAND Corporation, 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050, Tel (703) 413-1100-5184, Fax (703) 413-8111, email: howard_shatz@rand.org apartheid regime in South Africa. They have been declared against French products following a resumption of nuclear testing in the 1990s, and most recently they were declared by part of the Muslim world against Danish products several months after the publication of cartoons of the prophet Muhammad in a Danish newspaper.
Calls for a boycott can have one of three effects. Consumers can honor the boycott, leading to a decline in sales of the product being boycotted. They can ignore the boycott, leading to no change in sales. Or, expressing opposition to the goals of the boycott, they can increase their purchases, leading to increases in sales. In fact, this latter effect is alleged to have occurred regarding the boycott of Danish products in 2006 (Hitchens, 2006) . Thus, the aggregate effect is an entirely empirical matter. This paper studies the boycott issue by investigating U.S. consumer behavior during the run-up, major combat, and immediate post-combat lull of the Iraq War that started in 2003.
France proved a tenacious opponent to U.S. plans to marshal a multinational force to invade Iraq and depose its dictator, Saddam Hussein, and calls for a boycott of French wine and other products rebounded throughout the United States. Emotions ran high. Taking a cue from the bandits of the Mexican mountains who eschewed government-sanctioned, peace-officer identification (Traven, 1934) , one boycotter proclaimed on national television, "We don't need your stinking wine" (Lou Dobbs Moneyline, 2003b) .
We find that at first glance, the calls for a boycott did lead to a decline in French wine sales in the United States. However, at the time of the boycott, French wine sales had already been declining over a longer period, and just before the boycott period, sales of French wine had experienced a seasonal holiday peak. When the secular decline and seasonal effects are accounted for, there is no boycott effect. Our work builds on the previous work of Vannerson (2004) by using microdata on wine sales for nearly 4,700 brands in the United States and studying the effects of the boycott on the revenue share of French wine, the quantity share, the quantity, and the price. Our results differ from those of Chavis and Leslie (2006) , and we explain those differences below.
In the next section, we review recent work on the French boycott. The subsequent section presents the key results using the microdata, and the section following contrasts this work with the opposite results found by Chavis and Leslie. A final section draws conclusions.
II. Recent Work on the French Boycott of 2003
The U.S. boycott of French wine was not the first faced by the French. In 1995, after the French military announced a series of nuclear tests in the South Pacific, Denmark embarked on a boycott of French products. There appears to have been remarkable unanimity. All Danish political parties signed a protest letter to the French government, and a Danish minister wrote a letter to his French counterpart, on behalf of the Danish government, to try to stop the tests. In addition, a major Danish retail chain stopped marketing French products and was joined by other Danish retailers. Bentzen and Smith (2001) find a boycott effect at the end of 1995 and the beginning of 1996, even after taking account of seasonal components and a trend decline in the market share of French wine. They also find a possible longer-run effect through 1998. However, they do not reject the existence of price effects during 1995 and 1996.
The political situation in the United States in 2003 was quite different from that in Denmark in 1995 and 1996. Unlike in the Danish case, the United States was not united in its interest in punishing the French for their opposition to the Iraq War. Rather, the country was deeply divided over the policy, and therefore many people not only saw no need to punish the French, but rather saw buying French products as an opportunity to praise the French for their opposition to the proposed war.
Vannerson (2004) (1)
In the equation, W is the revenue share of French wine sales in the United States, in percentage points, B is a dummy for the boycott period, H is a seasonal dummy for the holiday period, and T is a time trend. These are explained below.
The data are gathered from scanners in high volume supermarket chains in 64 major U.S. markets, and were provided by Information Resources, Inc. (IRI). They include dollar sales and prices organized by country of origin, type of wine (table, dessert (Table 1 , column 2, a specification not in the original paper). The French revenue share in the boycott period was lower on average than in the previous 18 four-week periods.
Table 1 about here
However, French wine sales ordinarily increase in November, December, and January, a This basic insight is robust to other measures of French wine sales. It may have been the case that fewer bottles of French wine were purchased during the boycott period, but that they were more expensive on average, leading to no effect on revenue share. Regressions using French quantity share as a dependent variable indicate that without a holiday indicator and a time trend the boycott appears to have been effective. However, when these are included, once again the estimated boycott coefficient becomes statistically insignificant (bottom of Table 1 ). This suggests that there was no boycott effect on the quantity of French wine sold in the United States.
In contrast, Chavis and Leslie (2006) There are other differences as well. Most important, using the same dummy variable approach as in Vannerson, they define the boycott period as the first eight weeks after the start of the war, or March 17, 2003 , through May 11, 2003 . They then study the effects of the boycott on quantities and prices of French wine sold. In each specification, the boycott effect is negative and statistically significant. They also conduct the analysis using non-linear least squares and find similar results.
III. New Results on the U.S. Boycott
We build on the Vannerson paper by exploiting the microstructure of the IRI data. (1).
W is some measure of wine sales-revenue share, natural log of quantity, quantity share, or natural log of price-for each wine i from each country of origin j in each of 22 four-week time periods t. B is a dummy variable for the boycott period, the four four-week periods starting January 27, 2003, and is included only for observations on French wines. H is a dummy for the holiday period, the three four-week periods starting November 5, 2001, and the three four-week periods starting November 4, 2002, and again is included only for observations on French wines.
Following Chavis and Leslie (2006) and analogous to Vannerson (2004) , T is an origin-specific time trend for each country or region of origin of the wine (Vannerson tests French revenue share but does not include separate observations by country of origin and therefore uses one time trend rather than origin-specific time trends).
Among the other variables in equation (2), N is a wine-specific dummy, allowing us to remove a significant amount of unobserved heterogeneity, such as label aesthetics, the public's perception of specific brands, and even general price level of the wine (although we do test a specification with price explicitly entered as an explanatory variable). M is a month-specific dummy for each four-week period, and ε is an error term. Origin countries and regions include Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, California, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New York, New Zealand, Oregon and Washington, Portugal, Romania, Russia, South Africa, South America, Spain, and Yugoslavia.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 show the key results. Only coefficients for the boycott dummy are shown. Column 1 is comparable to Table 1, column 1, in which no holiday dummy or time trend is included. The results seem to provide strong evidence of a boycott effect, although smaller than that indicated in Table 1 when measured at the mean revenue share. In Table 1 , the boycott reduced the French revenue share by almost 20 percent (0.56 divided by 2.83), but in Table 2 it reduced the French brand-specific revenue share by only 3 percent (0.659 divided by 21.31; all revenue shares are multiplied by 100,000). At the median, however, the size of the effect is the opposite. In Table 1 , the boycott reduced the French revenue share by the same 20 percent (0.56 divided by 2.85), but in Table 2 it reduced the French brand-specific revenue share by almost 1,000 percent (0.659 divided by 0.061).
Table 2 about here
Results for quantity and quantity shares as dependent variables similarly indicate a boycott effect, and all are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. However, these results do not take account of the special holiday effect experienced by French wine or the secular decline in sales of French wine. In fact, many varieties of Champagne could have experienced dramatic decreases in the late winter and early spring, having been bought in December for New Year and then not purchased again until a year later.
When holiday and trend effects are included, the boycott effect disappears (column 2). In all cases-the revenue share of each brand, the quantity of each brand, and the quantity share of each brand-sales are unaffected by the boycott. In fact, the point estimates for the effect of the boycott on revenue share and quantity share actually are positive, although these coefficients are not statistically significant.
In their paper, Chavis and Leslie try specifications in which they include only brands that have strictly positive sales in their boycott and comparison periods. We follow their lead in columns 3 through 6, including all brands that have strictly positive sales in all periods in the regressions.
In Appendix Table 2 we show the same results when all observations with strictly positive sales are included, even though observations for those same brands may have zero sales in some months, rather than the Table 2 regressions of only brands with strictly positive sales over the entire period of analysis.
The results confirm the basic findings. In most cases without the holiday dummy or the time trend, the boycott appears to have affected sales of French wines in the United States.
Oddly, the boycott appears to be related to increased price, which Chavis and Leslie also found.
However, in every case with the holiday dummy and time trend are included, there is no boycott effect, except in the case of quantities, and here the boycott is related to an increase in the quantity of French wine bought.
Although the results are similar to those using the full dataset, we do not agree that the observations with zero sales should be omitted. Chavis and Leslie justify this by noting that zero sales in any one period might result from stocking decisions of retailers or distributors, rather than consumers' choices. However, zero sales might also result from consumers' choices, and thus including them provides valuable information. Furthermore, if brands were being withheld, the number of brands with zero sales should be higher during the boycott period compared to earlier periods. However, this was not the case. For all of the 22 periods, the number of French brands with zero sales ranged from 504 to 518, with the median 510.5 (the average of 510 for the 11 th observation and 511 for the 12 th observation when ranked from low to high). French brands with zero sales during the boycott period totaled 509 (period 22), 510 (period 21), 511 (period 20), and 514 (period 19). The number of brands with zero sales actually decreased during the boycott period, hardly evidence of negative stocking decisions by distributors or retailers.
IV. Boycott Effects and the Boycott Period
One other important difference between the analysis so far and that of Chavis and Leslie is the designated boycott period. They use two methods. In the first, they limit the boycott period to the first eight weeks after the start of the war. France and Russia, which both hold veto power in the United Nations Security Council, and
Germany announced that they would not allow a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq (The New York Times, 2003) . French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin reiterated this on March 7, backed up by Russia and China, which also holds veto power (Barringer, 2003) . And on March 10 in Paris, French President Jacques Chirac announced that France would veto a United Nations resolution authorizing the use of force, "whatever the circumstances" (Sciolino, 2003) .
To further explore the timing of the boycott, we conducted a Nexis search using the string "wine AND boycott" for major newspapers and transcripts during the period November 1, 2002, to June 30, 2003. Lists of media included in these groups appear in Appendix Table 4 . In both cases, we excluded all non-U.S. sources. As an aside, we note that the first time the term "freedom fries" appeared as a substitute for "French fries" in a major newspaper was reported hearing from one reader that perhaps the time to start boycotting French products had arrived, and he announced that he "had already started buying Australian, Argentine and Chilean wines in preference to the French wines." On February 11, the message was a little saltier. One reader from Dayton, Ohio, wrote that he was about to buy a bottle of French wine when a man next to him "looking at the same wine said, '[expletive deleted] the French, I wouldn't drink it if it were free!' and picked up another bottle of wine, Aussie I think, glared at me and walked away. I thought to myself, 'yep, me too pal, with barbed wire' and grabbed an Aussie bottle myself" (Instapundit.com, 2003) .
Indeed, that specific post led Australian wag Tim Blair, a columnist for The Bulletin, an Australian newspaper, and an independent blogger (TimBlair.net), to encourage Australian wineries on February 19 to move quickly into the newfound opportunity. "Attention, Australian wine exporters: the marketing opportunity of the century presents itself in the United States," he wrote, "where French and German weasel wines are now shunned" (Blair, 2003) .
Other blogs show similar evidence of boycott action before the start of the Iraq War. On (Table 3) . As expected, without a holiday dummy or a time trend, the estimate of the boycott effect is negative and statistically significant. However, in contrast to the results using a four-month boycott period, when the holiday dummy and time trends are added, the boycott effect remains negative and statistically significant, as Chavis and Leslie found.
Table 3 about here
This may actually be a boycott effect, but not quite the way the boycotters intended.
When the boycott dummy is omitted from the regression, but the holiday dummy and the time trend are included, actual purchases for the period January 27 to February 23 are well above their predicted value, the largest underprediction for all 22 observations (Figure 1 ). There is evidence that this was also a time when people were actually overpurchasing French wines to protest Finally, we subject the full brand-level dataset to the analysis using only a two-month boycott period (Table 5) . We use a specification as close as possible to that of Chavis and
Leslie, omitting the holiday dummy from column 2 (it is included in Table 2 , column 2). Even without the holiday dummy, but with the time trend, when all observations are included, including those with zero values, the boycott effect is not significant (column 2). The effect on revenue share is negative, but with a t-statistic of -1.04 and a p-value of 0.3. The effect on quantity is positive, but it is negative on quantity share, and in neither specification is it statistically significant. origin-specific time trends shows a negative and large boycott effect (column 5). Although this is significant at only the 10 percent level, it is troubling.
However, there is one factor missing. As noted previously, French wines experience a seasonal holiday sales increase, and the regressions in columns 1 through 5 in this table do not include an indicator for the holiday period. When that indicator is added, in column 6, the estimate of the boycott effect decreases in magnitude and becomes statistically insignificant.
There is no boycott effect, even when the boycott period is designated as March 24 to May 18, the two months after the start of the Iraq War.
V. Conclusion
On April The data simply do not support this conclusion, however. There is no evidence that at the retail level, American consumers as a whole turned their backs on French wines at a faster rate than they had already been turning them. In fact, there were even news reports around the same time that the boycott had not affected sales: In fact, many of the anti-France movements have barely caused a ripple. Sales of French wines aren't suffering even though some bottles have been dumped down the drain. And while some state legislatures threatened to boycott Frenchowned businesses, it lasted about as long as it took them to discover that French-owned companies in their own back yard provide thousands of jobs and products for their residents (Dang, 2003) . We cannot rule out the possibility that the boycott had a very large effect on sales of French wine. We can, however, rule out the claim that there was a very large effect in one direction-downward. Rather, with the U.S. deeply divided over the wisdom of engaging in the Iraq War, the boycott threats might have had both large negative and positive effects, encouraging pro-war consumers to modify their purchases away from French goods, and encouraging anti-war consumers to modify their purchases towards French goods.
On March 14, three days before Bush delivered his ultimatum, Middletown, Connecticut, Navy veteran Bill Earls wrote that he bought a case of French wine in support of the French.
"The French are making some good points and being maligned for it" (Earls, 2003) . Around the same time, Senator Evan Bayh (D-Indiana), when asked on The O'Reilly Factor whether he would honor the boycott, said, "Well, I'm not going to be running out to buy any French wine in the near future. I'll say that" (The O'Reilly Factor, 2003) . The most we can say is that the aggregate effect represented no change in preferences, a surprising result given that even the French themselves thought that the boycott had been effective.
Besides expressing anti-war sentiments, there may have been many other reasons to buy French wines. They communicate a modicum of savoir-faire, and they are often cheaper than comparable California wines. Perhaps people stopped buying Dannon yogurt instead. 5, 2001 5, , through January 27, 2002 , and the column 1, 3, and 4 holiday period. Quantity shares and revenue shares are multiplied by 100,000. Following Chavis and Leslie (2006) , in the log of quantity regressions of columns 1 and 2 we add a 1 to every quantity for every brand in order not to lose those brands with zero sales in any given period. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the estimate is statistically significant at the ten-, five-, or one-percent level, respectively. All regressions include wine and month fixed effects. Notes: Regressions include all observations with strictly positive sales, even though observations for those same brands may have zero sales in some months, rather than the Table 5 regressions of only brands with strictly positive sales over the entire period of analysis. Columns 1 through 4 correspond to Table 5, Following Chavis and Leslie (2006) , in the log of quantity regressions we add a 1 to every quantity for every brand in order not to lose those brands with zero sales in any given period. Heteroscedasticityrobust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the estimate is statistically significant at the ten-, five-, or one-percent level, respectively. All regressions include wine and month fixed effects.
